Hickman, in his contribution to this symposium, shows how Democracy and Education offers an alternative framework for deploying technology — as a way of empowering students and cultivating the project of a democratic education. We would like, therefore, to illustrate, in broad strokes, the reasons why we had spotlighted these themes. LW ff. See also Waks This difference reverberated also in contrasting views about educational reform:. Whereas for Dewey freedom was both the end and the means of social change, the Bolshevists wanted to enforce the idea of social freedom by authoritarian means — even in school.
Mchitarjan 4. In Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy Dewey 56 , while discussing the medieval synthesis, Dewey highlights:. The thing which is enduringly effective, however, is the existence of a social institution as the source, bearen nurse, and administrator of the imaginative and emotional appeals.
Dewey strongly opposed this educational conception LW ff. This book has the following object: the philosophical foundation of the Catholic doctrine of education and the educational foundation of the Catholic conception of life. The existence of a mutual relationship between the doctrine of education and philosophy of life represents the core thought of the entire work.
We are not suggesting that de Hovre would have qualified his views on Dewey had he carefully studied Democracy and Education.
This is not by chance. The most important educational work of Maritain, Education at the Crossroads , culminated in an appeal to American youth to break free from the instrumentalist and pragmatist philosophy. For Maritain, instrumentalism poses a threat to the democratization of American education — a trend he saw as one of the glories of US. Along with this epistemology-oriented critique, Maritain states as a primary concern that pragmatism cannot accommodate the human aspiration to interior freedom because it insists on the exclusively social character of the self.
He disapproves, however, of the lack of any reference to criteria on the basis of which to assess the aims and values of education see also Valentine If we take up in one picture, on the one hand, the European Catholic thinker speaking to an American audience and invoking a sure anchorage in the scholastic metaphysics in order to underpin the American democratic project and, on the other, the American pragmatist philosopher critically revisiting the European heritage in order to counter some trends of the American scene, we get a good sense of the trans-Atlantic give-and-take, which this symposium has endeavoured to explore in reference to Democracy and Education.
He saw nationalism as the root cause of these conflicts. His account goes as follows: 18th century philosophes condemned hierarchical social and political arrangements and like the ancient stoics, idealized a social organization of free individuals as wide as humanity. But they offered no concrete means for realizing this new order MW 9: In practice, however, state educational systems were instead shaped to supply soldiers, workers, and administrators for the state, not to foster liberal individuality.
Society is widening, thus weakening the efficiency and reach of received national institutions and making them less effective as guarantors of human rights MW 5: But so long as nation states act in isolation as competitors, transnational institutions can do no more than pick up the pieces after inevitable wars. He argues that America is genuinely multi-national and thus a non-nation state. In the modern American industrial city, we have a. MW 9: The very differences between learners — as displayed by their divergent outlooks shaped by their different ethnic backgrounds as they approach common tasks — are primary subject matters.
One hundred years after the publication of Democracy and Education , democratic education of this sort remains vastly incomplete in the United States and elsewhere. On the other hand, transnational institutions exist at regional and global levels. The once belligerent nations of Europe are now joined together in an economic and cultural community with its own political agencies. European citizens readily cross national borders to study, work, and enjoy recreational and cultural enrichment.
What might Democracy and Education offer the European project of today? We offer two suggestions. As detailed in several of the articles in this special issue, like the United States, Europe, both in its several nations and as a transnational community, has arguably fallen into this trap with its concerns for educational efficiency and performance as measured by standardized tests.
Consider this statement:. Improving the quality and efficiency of education is at the centre of education policy debate at both national and EU level.
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It involves raising performance in compulsory education, in particular with regard to the high percentage of low-achieving year-olds in reading, maths and science and more generally preparing young people for the knowledge society of the 21st century. In this context, reliable information on pupil performance is key to the successful implementation of targeted education policies and it is not surprising that in the past two decades national tests have emerged as an important tool for providing a measure of educational achievement. The next group is 'conventional': Stage 3 is cally and scientifically comprehensive, clear and workable approach to moral the good-boy-good-girl stage, in which good behaviour is that which is education extant' He went on to say that the workability of the approved by ochers, and intentions count heavily; Stage 4 is o ri ented toward system has been demonstrated in Soviet Russia, and describes what he calls d uty, understood as obeying fixed rules and respecting authority.
T he 'pose- the 'logical but co us rather horrifying innovations' suggested by conventional' level includes Stage 5, which is a rights or social contract Durkheim's ideas ; cf.
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Some of these reasons arc of more than anti- rules, and Stage 6, the highest stage, which involves self-chosen ethi cal prin- quarian interest, for they reveal persistem difficulties and lacu nae in ciples, which are nor concrete rules, bur universal p rinciples, such as justice, Kohlberg's conception and one need not accept Durkheim's conception as a equality of rights and the dig ni ty of individual persons. People pass through whole to recognize these difficulties. So the comrast between the two these stages in the course of moral development, though some get sruck ar approaches provides an opportunity for recognizing the form of problems lower stages, and of course rourinely employ considerations from severa l still to be overcome in the theory of moral education.
Part of the background to rhe development of this model is the apparent Theory failure, exemplified in the s' efforts of H artshorne and May, 2 ro measure the virtues as they fig ure in ordinary language, such as honesty, generosity The core of Kohlberg's critique of Durkheim relies on a presupposition and self-control, chat is ro say, ro make them correspond to a complex of which is deeply embedded in modern ethical writing. Kohlberg is, like stab le, measurable psychological traits of ind ivid uals. In contrast, the modern philosophy from Descartes and Kant, a justificationalist, in that he Kohlbergian stages do correspond to som ethi ng stable and measu rable, and supposes that the true and valid moral position is one which may be justi- are sequential.
The problem with rhe Kohlbergian model is in a sense a fied by a chain of reasons.
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Moral reflection is a matter of noticing conflicts or product of irs virtues- raking progress though these stages as 'moral devel- contradictions in one's m oral beliefs or judgments and resolving these opment' amounts ro changing the subject. We are no longer talking abour contradictions at a higher and more comprehensive level, fo r example by a rhe virtues, bur about something else. T he something else, in the end, is rhe principle that shows which of the moral clai ms is superior to the other.
A use of parti cular kinds of moral arguments, and 'development' is using more typical example of this kind of reasoning is the problem of racial preference: and more general ideas. But this internalization is not merely private assent to a common seen in a few simple contrasts.
The classical conception of virtue, for opinion, for the moral fact, such as duty, continues to be experienced by the example, treated it as something akin to an acquired skill.
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A long tradition actor as something 'outside' the individual. But they are impersonal, and the mark of this faculty which enabled a person to distinguish right and wrong, and was 'impersonal' character is the fact that they are, as the expression goes, cultur- given by nature. It may be noted in connection with Kohlberg, who appeals ally conditioned. They are, in Durkheim's terms, forces outside and to the example of contraCt theory, that it was felt by many writers in this independent of rhe private desires of the individual.
Hilary Putnam, discuss ing the feel any compulsion to keep the social contract into which they had entered. Durkheim, similarly, that I found myself agonizing over whether what I was doing, contem- supposes that moral development consists in something other than facility plating doing, or had done, was right - really right' But rhe in moral justification, something more akin to mastery. But there is more to phenomenology of moral conduct is not Durkheim 's true concern. His true it than this. The one development which destroyed intuitionism as an concern is with the influence of the moral order on conduct, and this is empirical theory of the nature of morality was the fact that different cultures essentially a causal question.
The phenomenological experience of feeling adhered to moral codes radically unlike those the intuitionists claimed ro be outside moral facts to be determinative of one's desires is merely epiphenom- known to a developed moral faculty. Durkheim recognized that variations enal to the causal process by which choices are determined.
durinot.info/solfato-di-idrossiclorochina-e-clorochina-fosfato-tablet.php In cases where between moral notions occurred between societies, and recognized, in his the individual does not feel impulses which conflict with the social and famous arguments for the explanatory autonomy of sociology as agai nst moral forces acting on him, he does not feel outside 'constraint', bur the psychology, that the causes of this variation had therefore to be sought in social or moral forces are none the less determinative.
H e further recog- Kohlberg of course does nor subscribe to the notion of the collective nized that the idea of 'social evolution' would not suffice to explain the consciousness. But the point served by the concept for Durkheim is one with differences. Specifically, he noted the existence of systematic patterns of - which Kohlberg, as a moral educator, should be concerned. For Durkheim coincidence or correlation between distinct types of custom which held up the problem of the salience of moral no tions to the agent and their actual apart from evolutionary development, such as the relation between a certain influence on his conduct is treated as a causal, indeed quantitative, problem type of family structure and the nuptial custom of carrying the bride over of measuring the 'force' of these 'collective consciousness' facts on agents.
To put it sharply, morality consists in acting The existence of such patterns led Durkheim to postulate the existence of morally, not in rationalizing action in moral terms. Durkheim put a different point on the concept, however, in that he considered that the proof of the Technique concept lay in showing it to be governed by causal laws. Naturally, such Durkheim's suggestions on educational technique follow from his sociology : laws could not be proved directly, since the realm of collective consciousness, so Kohlberg's remarks on his techniques of moral education must be evalu- like the general will, could not be directly observed.
It could be observed ated in light of the prior difference in basic conception and intent between only through the causal effects of these facts on the facts at the level of indi- Durkheim and Koblberg. Kohlberg associates Durkheim wirh the group- vidual action.